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JUSTICE WHITE MIXES MORE THAN JUST COLOR TO CREATE A
NEW SHADE OF RACIAL PROTECTION*

IN Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji' and Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb,2 a unanimous Supreme Court, in opinions
authored by Justice White, extended civil rights protection under
42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1982 to ethnic origin groups. In
Saint Francis, Justice White went beyond color distinctions and
granted section 1981 protection to an American-Iraqi college professor who was denied tenure. a Similarly, in Shaare Tefila the
Court granted recovery under section 1982 to a Jewish community
whose temple had been vandalized.4 These decisions should resolve
5
much of the uncertainty that has plagued the lower courts.
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court decisions in light
of the pre-existing lower court decisions in this area. 6 It will then
examine the remedies available under sections 1981 and 1982 to
emphasize the significance of the decisions.7 The Note will demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court, through Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila, has provided a broad, new avenue through
which injured parties may seek justice. However, the decisions offer little guidance to lower courts that must apply their holdings
to other cases. The purpose of this Note is to pose a hypothetical
fact pattern as a means of suggesting the manner in which the
holdings in Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila should be implemcnted by the lower courts.8 In its proposed resolution of this hypothetical the Note will reveal that these decisions impose a min-

* The author wishes to acknowledge the continuous kindness and support of his family, especially that of his parents, Richard and Mary DiLisi, and that of his grandmother,
Carmela Frate, to whom this Note is respectfully dedicated. The author also wishes to
thank the following persons for their helpful comments, assistance, and encouragement:
Professors Barbara Snyder and Jonathan Entin, Michelle Rieck, Sharon Woznicki and
Mary Ann Nofel.
1. 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987).
2. 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987).
3. Saint Francis, 107 S. Ct. at 2028.
4. Shaare Tefila, 107 S. Ct. at 2022.
5. See infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 68-126 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
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ute burden on potential plaintiffs. In light of this small burden,
sections 1981 and 1982 are able to provide protection to a wide
range of injured parties."
I. Saint Francis AND Shaare Tefila
In the Spring of 1987, the United States Supreme Court was
confronted with two cases in which the plaintiff sought recovery
for ethnic origin discrimination under section 1981 and section
1982.10 Section 1981 states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and extractions of every kind, and to no other.
In attempting to apply the broad and ambiguous language of section 1981, the federal district and appellate courts have developed
different approaches and consequently rendered inconsistent opinions." The courts have found the legislative history to be of little
additional help in applying section 1981.12 Using equally ambiguous language, section 1982 states that "[a]ll citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as
is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property." In spite of the ambiguities in sections 1981 and 1982, these provisions have usually
been interpreted concurrently with respect to the scope of their
application.'"
A.

Statement of the Cases

In Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the plaintiff was an
associate professor at Saint Francis College who was denied tenure after teaching for five years. He was a member of the Muslim

9. Id.
10. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987); Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987).
11. See infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 27-33, 37-67 and accompanying text.
13. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973)("In
light of the historical interrelationship between section 1981 and section 1982, we see no
reason to construe the sections differently .... ").
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faith who had been born in Iraq and later became a United States
citizen. 4 Because AI-Khazraji was convinced his tenure rejection
was due to his religion and ethnic origin, he brought suit against
the college alleging that Saint Francis had violated its own tenure
guidelines in denying him tenure and that the decision was motivated by bias, purpose, and discrimination. More specifically, AlKhazraji's complaint and amended complaint alleged violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. sections
1981, 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and 2000e, as well as breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.15
After several claims were dismisied for untimeliness, the crucial controversy centered on "whether a person of Arabian ancestry was protected from racial discrimination under section
1981. '"16 In a rather brief opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed

the Third Circuit's opinion permitting the plaintiff to seek recovery under section 1981. The Court held that:
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable
classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.
Such discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended section 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory. .

.

. It is

clear from our holding, however, that distinctive physiognomy is
not essential to qualify for section 1981 protection."7
In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, a Jewish community
brought suit against several vandals who desecrated their synagogue. 18 The defendants were accused of spray painting anti-Semitic slogans on the outer walls of the synagogue. Specifically, the
words "Death to the Jude," "In, Take A Shower Jew," "Toten
Kamf Raband," and "Dead Jew," along with swastikas, Ku Klux
Klan symbols, and a skull and crossbones were painted with red
and black paint on the outer walls.' 9 The plaintiffs filed their
claims under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982, and 1985(3). They
also filed trespass, nuisance, and intentional infliction of emotional
14. AI-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 507 (3d Cir. 1986), affid,
107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987).

15. Id. at 508.
16. Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2025 (1987).
17. Id. at 2028.
18. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523, 525 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd,
107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987).
19. Id. at 525.
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distress claims. 20
The Supreme Court applied the same analysis used in Saint
Francis and granted section 1982 coverage to the plaintiffs. The
Court thereby reversed the Fourth Circuit decision that did not
allow the plaintiffs to present their claims.21
B. Persuasiveness of Decisions and Authority Relied Upon
Since the Supreme Court was rendering a decision on previously unsettled issues, it is not surprising that it cited only a small
amount of precedent. Rather than relying on case law, Justice
White focused primarily upon dictionary definitions2 2 and underlying notions of justice.23
1. Scientific Support
Justice White first demonstrates that determining the precise
definition of race with respect to sections 1981 and 1982 is impractical and probably impossible. He cites anthropological and
biological authority to indicate that even scientists have abandoned racial classification. 4
2.

Dictionary and Encyclopedia Definitions

In light of the impossibility of establishing a scientific definition of race, Justice White turned to definitions of race taken from
late nineteenth and early twentieth century dictionaries and encyclopedias. 25 He focused on these definitions in order to determine
common notions of race during the time when the predecessor of
Section 1981, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was passed. After citing several definitions, the Court concluded that "[t]hese dictionary and encyclopedia sources are somewhat diverse, but it is clear
that they do not support the claim that for purposes of section
1981, Arabs, Englishmen, Germans and certain other ethnic
' '26
groups are to be considered a single race.
Through this brief analysis the Court not only demonstrated
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
tions are
25.
26.

Id.
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019, 2021 (1987).
Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2026-27 (1987).
Id. at 2028.
Id. at 2026 (The Court stated that some authorities agree that "racial classificafor the most part sociopolitical, rather than biological in nature.").
Id. at 2026-27.
Id. at 2027.
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that a precise definition of race is impractical, but that race can
be classified into more categories than just black, white, and oriental. Although the authority relied upon for this argument is considerably less than highly persuasive, it allowed the Court to effectively demonstrate the worthlessness of the imposition of rigid
barriers between what is racial and what is non-racial, and consequently between who is protected and who is not.
3. Legislative History
In an effort to add meaning to the term "race," Justice White
turned to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Civil Rights Act, the predecessor to section 1981, was passed
during the Reconstruction Era in order to ensure, at least on paper, that newly-freed slaves would have a remedy for deprivations
of basic freedoms.2 The statutory language indicates that the Act
was intended to provide the rights "enjoyed by white citizens" to
"all persons." '
Although the historical setting and statutory language of the
Act seem to limit the statute's applicability to blacks, Justice
White is able to cite fairly convincing remarks by Congressmen
that clearly indicate that the Act was intended to apply to groups
that are no longer considered racially distinct.29 The most convincing of these citations are to remarks made by Senator Shellabarger and Representative Bingham that make direct references
to ethnic groups as being protected under the Act."0 Conducting a
thorough examination of the congressional debates, the Court
noted that Congress specifically considered racially distinct classifications to include individuals whose ancestries were Chinese,
Scandinavian, Spanish, English, Irish, Mexican, Mongolian, Prus-

27. See Kaozorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866:
A Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 550 (1989)("a
principal purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would be to grant to the Freedmen basic
economic rights"). See also Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1986).
29. Saint Francis, 107 S. Ct. at 2027.
30. Id. (The Court quoted Senator Shellabarger who stated, "[w]ho will say that
Ohio can pass a law enacting that no man of the German race . . . shall ever own any

property in Ohio, or shall ever make a contract in Ohio, or ever inherit property in Ohio, or
ever come into Ohio to live, or even to work? If Ohio may pass such a law, and exclude a
German citizen . . . because he is of the German nationality or race, then may every other
State do so.").
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sian, French, or Jewish. 3
After clearly demonstrating that the late-nineteenth century
congressional notions of race are quite different from those of today, the Court used those earlier notions as a basis for allowing
individuals now considered racially homogeneous, yet ethnically
identifiable, to sustain a section 1981 and 1982 claim.32 In other
words, a plaintiff alleging ethnic origin discrimination under section 1981 and 1982 can no longer have his .claims dismissed simply because he is not a member of a racially distinct group, provided that he is able to demonstrate that he is a member of an
identifiable group that was considered racially distinct by the
Congress which enacted the predecessor or those sections. In
Shaare Tefila, the Court stated that "[t]he question before us is
not whether Jews are considered to be a separate race by today's
standards, but whether, at the time section 1982 was adopted,
Jews constituted a group of people that Congress intended to protect." 3 3 Justice White's use of Congress' original intent in this
manner enabled him to effectively legitimate his application of
sections 1981 and 1982 to a broader base of potential claimants.
4. The Product
The outcome of these cases seems most appropriate when one
realizes that civil rights remedies were mandated and that the Supreme Court merely responded by providing them. While the rule
enunciated in Saint Francis and applied in Shaare Tefila follows
logically from Justice White's reasoning, it also appears to contain
some contradictions. The Court first stated that based upon the
legislative history, Congress intended to protect "identifiable classes" from discrimination based solely on ancestry or ethnic characteristics and that such discrimination is racial. 4 The Court then
stated that "[a] distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify
for section 1981 protection." 35 In other words, section 1981 applies to ethnic origin discrimination, but the plaintiff need not possess distinctive physical characteristics to prevail in such an ac31. Id. at 2027-28.
32. Id. at 2028 (The Court stated that "[b]ased on the history of section 1981, we
have little trouble in concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination
identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because
of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics").
33. Shaare Tefila, 107 S. Ct. at 2020.
34. Saint Francis, 107 S.Ct. at 2028.
35.

Id.
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tion. It seems difficult to imagine how an individual could prove
that another had discriminated against him based upon his ethnic
background when the person discriminated against does not possess indicative physical characteristics. The defendant could easily
argue that he was unaware of the plaintiff's ancestry. The plaintiff, however, may be able to demonstrate that the defendant
based his actions on some personal knowledge of the plaintiff's ancestry or from conclusions drawn from the plaintiff's last name.
The potential difficulties with respect to the application of the
court's rule will be discussed more fully in the hypothetical section
which follows.36
In spite of the aforementioned difficulties, the rule set forth in
these cases clearly defines racial discrimination as including ethnic
origin discrimination for the purposes of sections 1981 and 1982.
In order to fully appreciate the somewhat radical avenue selected
by the Court, an examination of previous lower court approaches
and their inconsistent outcomes is necessary.
C. Analysis in Light of Precedent
When confronted with the issues presented in Saint Francis
and Shaare Tefila the federal district courts and the circuit courts
of appeal have utilized different approaches to arrive at different
conclusions. This inconsistency is perhaps most clearly presented
in the Third anda Fourth Circuit cases from which these two cases
originally arose. 7
1. The Fourth Circuit Approach: Shaare Tefila Congregation
v. Cobb
In Shaare Tefila, the plaintiffs, a Jewish Congregation, alleged that the defendant's desecration of their synagogue was racial in character and motivated by racial animus. 38 The congrega36. See infra text accompanying notes 127-42.
37. See Kaufman, A Race By Any Other Name: The Interplay Between Ethnicity,
National Origin and Race for Purposes of Section 1981, 28 ARIz. L. REv. 259 (1986);
Note, Beyond a Black and White Reading of Sections 1981 and 1982: Shifting the Focus
from Racial Status to Racist Acts, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 823 (1987)(These notes provide a
thorough analysis and classification of the pertinent case law which preceeded the Saint
Francis and Shaare Tefila decisions.).
38. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523, 525 (4th Cir. 1986)(In their
complaint, the plaintiffs stated that "[d]efendants' desecration of the synagogue . . . deprived plaintiffs of the full and equal benefit of laws for the security of persons and property. Defendants' desecration . . . was motivated by racial prejudice in that defendants
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tion maintained, however, that "Jews are not members of a
racially distinct group and do not wish to be so considered." 3 9 The
Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs claim and denied protection
under both section 1981 and section 1982 as a matter of law. The
court held:
We . . .find nothing in the statute, its legislative history, or

subsequent case law which would lead us to conclude that section 1982 was intended to apply to situations in which a plaintiff
is not a member of a racially distinct group but is merely perceived to be so by defendants.
Because discrimination against Jews is not racial discrimination

. . .

we find that the district court properly dismissed the

congregation's section 1982 claim.40

The Fourth Circuit imposed its own definitions of race and denied
section 1981 and 1982 protection as a matter of law because the
plaintiffs did not fit into the court's definition of race.
This judicially controlled approach has been used by other
circuit courts. In Anooya v. Hilton Hotels Corporation,4 the First
Circuit was confronted with section 1981 claims arising out of a
wrongful discharge. The plaintiff alleged ethnic origin discrimination based on his Iraqi ancestry. Although racial discrimination
was alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, the court denied application of section 1981. The court supported its holding by stating
that "[t]he legislative history of the statute clearly indicates that
Congress intended to protect a limited category of rights, specifi' This decision is obviously quite
cally in terms of racial equality." 42
inconsistent with the approach the Supreme Court eventually
adopted in Saint Francis.
An approach similar to that used in Anooya was employed in

perceive plaintiffs as racially distinct because they are Jews."), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2019

(1987).
39. Id. at 526. Although the plaintiffs did not wish to be considered members of a
racially distinct group, they nevertheless argued that because the "defendants viewed Jews
as a racially distinct group, defendants' acts constituted racial discrimination in violation of
section 1982." Id.
40. Id. at 526-27.
41. 733 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1984)(The plaintiff claimed he was wrongfully discharged
by his former employer, Hilton Hotels Corporation. In his complaint, he alleged discrimination based on national origin, color, and race. The district court dismissed the complaint
in part for the plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This
decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.).
42. Id. at 50 (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966)).
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Petrone v. City of Reading.43 In Petrone, the court refused both
section 1981 and section 1982 protection to a plaintiff claiming
ethnic origin discrimination based upon his Italian heritage.
The federal courts have also used judicially-imposed definitions of race to extend the coverage of sections 1981 and 1982. In
Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Engineering,""the plaintiff alleged
that he was wrongfully discharged because he was brown-skinned
and therefore obviously of Mexican origin. In reversing the lower
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's section 1981 claim, the Ninth
Circuit held that "prejudice towards those of Mexican descent
having a skin color not characteristically Caucasian must be said
to be racial prejudice under section 1981."'1 Thus, judicially imposed definitions of race, which were based upon physical characteristics, permitted judges to dismiss or allow claims as a matter
of law. Obviously, this method of adjudication will produce results
which could vary from judge to judge and it has resulted in the
inconsistencies which have developed in the lower courts' application of these statutes.
Another drawback of relying on physiognomy is the fact that
it allows the judge to define "race." As the Supreme Court has
implied, this is a nearly impossible task. 6 Furthermore, courts
adopting this approach have based their decisions on inaccurate
readings of the legislative history. As the Supreme Court pointed
out, there is ample legislative history to support the proposition
that these statutes were intended to counter ethnic origin
43. 541 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the City
of Reading improperly imposed additional procedures upon him before issuing him an oc-

cupancy permit for his proposed pizza business. The plaintiff claimed that this disparate
treatment was a result of ethnic origin discrimination on the part of the city. The court
held that although section 1981 protections have been applied to Hispanics, the statute
may only be applied to those who "may be perceived as non-white, even though such racial
characterization may be unsound or debatable." Id. at 738 (quoting Madrigal v.
Certaineed Corp., 508 F. Supp. 310 (W.D. Mo. 1981)). The court stated that "[s]ince
plaintiff has asserted discrimination based only upon his heritage and there is no allegation
that plaintiff is generally perceived as a non-white, we will grant defendant's motion to
dismiss all section 1981 claims." Id. at 738.

44. 597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979). The plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was discharged from his job by the defendant and otherwise discriminated against because he was
of Mexican descent. The court noted that "a substantial portion of the Mexican population
traces its roots to a mixture of the Caucasian (Spanish) and native American races." Id. at

1300. The court concluded that the discrimination suffered by the plaintiff was "directed at
those Mexican-Americans having, by virtue of their descent, a brown rather than a white

skin." Id.
45.
46.

Id. at 1300.
Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2026 (1987).
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discrimination.47
2.

The Third Circuit Approach: Saint Francis College v. AlKhazraji

As stated earlier, the Saint Franciscase involved a well qualified college professor who alleged that he was discriminated
against. The Third Circuit acknowledged that there was no precise definition of race and that the legislative history of section
1981 indicated that its protection was not intended to be limited
to those who could demonstrate that they belonged to a particular
group identified and described by anthropologists.4 8 In overruling
the district court's summary judgment, the court held:
Discrimination based on race seems, at a minimum, to involve
discrimination directed against an individual because he or she
is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens. Accordingly, Al-Khazraji
should be allowed to prove that the discrimination he alleges is
racially motivated within the meaning of section 1981."1
In other words, the Third Circuit allowed "ethnics" to prevail
under section 1981 provided that they are able to prove to the jury
that they belong to a physiognomically distinctive group and that
they have been discriminated against because of such
membership.
This approach was recently adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 50 In Alizadeh, a white woman
alleged that she was wrongfully discharged by her employer because her husband was Iranian. Applying the rule adopted by the
Third Circuit in Saint Francis, the court vacated the district
court's summary judgment and granted the plaintiff an opportunity to prove that her discharge was based upon the fact that her

47. Id. at 2027-28.
48. AI-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 515-16 (3d Cir. 1986), affd,
107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987). The plaintiff alleged that he, a United States citizen, was denied
tenure at St. Francis College on account of his race, religion, and national origin. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order for summary judgment
entered in favor of the defendants with respect to the plaintiff's section 1981 claim. Id.
49. Id. at 517-18 (emphasis added).
50. 802 F.2d 1I1 (5th Cir. 1986)(The plaintiff was dismissed by her employer following allegations that she had stolen money. In addition to suing her employer, the plaintiff filed suit against her union, claiming that it failed to perform its duty of fair representation in violation of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Because
the plaintiff failed to show a basis for her husband's claims, or for her claims against the
union, the dismissal as to those claims was upheld.).

1988-891

JUSTICE WHITE'S RACIAL PROTECTION

1353

husband belongs to a physiognomically distinct sub-grouping."
In clinging to the requirement that a plaintiff must be found
to belong to a physiognomically distinct group, the courts which
have adopted this approach are still likely to produce inconsistent

results. Decisions could differ based upon the attitudes of the juries and the effectiveness of counsel.

3. The Racially Related Approach
The third approach adopted by the lower courts is illustrated
by Cubas v. Rapid American Corp. 2 In Cubas, the plaintiff filed
suit under section 1981 alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged from her employment because she was Cuban and be-

cause she was trying to organize activities on behalf of a dissident
faction within her union. In refusing to grant the defendant's mo-\
tion to dismiss, the court held that "[n]ational origin discrimination is actionable only to the extent that it is motivated by or indistinguishable from racial discrimination. '53 This approach has
also been followed by other federal courts. 4
This "racially-related approach" allows plaintiffs, as ethnics,
to allege acts of discrimination under section 1981 as long as the
discrimination in question is racial in character. This approach
also relies upon the jury to determine whether the acts qualify as
racial in nature. Had the Fourth Circuit applied this approach in
Shaare Tefila, a different result may have been reached. Although

Jews are considered to be Caucasian, the slogans painted on their
temple walls were arguably racial in nature. Such acts could have
51. The court stated that "Mrs. Alizadeh's husband was allegedly considered by the
defendant to be of a 'race other than white,' and we cannot say that he is any less ethnically and physiognomically distinctive, as compared to a 'white,' than was the Iraqi in AlKhazraji." Id. at 115.
52. 420 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
53. Id. at 665 (The court further stated that "Itihe right to equal treatment which is
guaranteed by the statute, protects against discrimination based on race, or on alienage."

Id.).
54. See Bullard v. Omi Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981)(Plaintiffs
were black and white employees who alleged discrimination upon being replaced by oriental employees. In overruling the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the court stated that "[t]he line between national origin discrimination and racial
discrimination is an extremely difficult one to trace. An attempt to make such a demarcation before both parties have had an opportunity to offer evidence at trial is inappropriate."
Id.); Enriquez v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901, 904 (W.D. Okla. 1977)(The court
stated that "the line between discrimination on account of race and discrimination on account of national origin may be so thin as to be indiscernable; indeed, to state the matter
more succinctly, there may in some instances be overlap." Id.).
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been considered racial and therefore covered by section 1981
under the Cubas test.
4.

Absence of Physical Characteristics Permissible

The fourth approach is one which does not require the plaintiff to possess distinctive physical characteristics in order to qualify for the protection of section 1981. This approach was adopted
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Manzanares v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 5 in which an employee of Mexican ancestry was discharged for stealing and then reinstated without seniority or backpay after being acquitted of the charges. The plaintiff was able to
demonstrate that Anglo-Americans were accorded much more lenient treatment. In reversing the district court's dismissal, the
Tenth Circuit held:
It is sufficient for our purposes that as a matter of common
knowledge, and as described in the opinions, a prejudice as alleged in the complaint does exist. It is directed against persons
with Spanish surnames. It is a group whose rights can be measured against a standard group or control group referred to in
section 1981.56
In other words, any group allocated distinguishable rights or demonstrating a prejudice can obtain protection even though they are
not able to demonstrate physiognomical distinctiveness.
In an effort to add meaning to the term "race," the court
relied upon a literal interpretation of the terms used in the statute.5" The court held that the statute required that the rights and
benefits rendered to various identifiable groups are to be measured
against the white citizen standard. The court acknowledged that
any effort to define race would be futile and simply chose to apply
section 1981 based upon a comparison to the Anglo control group.
The court explained:
If "white citizens" means a race, which technically does not

55. 593 F.2d 968, 969 (10th Cir. 1979)(The court stated that the issue on appeal
was "whether the allegations in the complaint that plaintiff was discriminated against because he was of 'Mexican-American descent,' and the employees who were alleged to have
received different treatment were 'Anglo,' were sufficient to permit plaintiff to seek relief
under 42 U.S.C. section 1981.").
56. Id. at 972. Acts by the defendants "were perpetrated upon the plaintiff because

of his race and/or national origin." Id. at 969.
57. Id. at 970 (Focusing upon the plain language of the statute, the court acknowledged that "section 1981 makes no mention of race, national origin, or alienage. The only
reference is that 'all persons' shall have described rights and benefits of 'white citizens.' ").
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seem particularly clear, it would seem that a group which is discriminated against because they are somehow different as compared to "white citizens" is within the scope of section 1981. We
cannot consider this as a "national origin" case and that alone.58

The court limited the applicability of this comparison to cases involving racial discrimination. It cannot be used to consider
prejudice based on gender or, interestingly enough, religion.59 Additionally, the approach advocated by Manzanares does not hinge
upon the notions of race held by the accused discriminator.60
Manzanares has been consistently distinguished or rejected
by other courts confronted with these issues. 6 Nonetheless, the

expansive approach taken by Manzanares most closely resembles
the approach recently adopted by the Supreme Court. The Su-

preme Court, however, was more direct in that it explicitly stated
that a "distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for section 1981 protection." 62
Saint Francis,6 3 Shaare Tefila,6 4 and Manzanares6 5 essen-

tially adhered to the principles previously established by the Supreme Court.66 As discussed earlier, this approach, although
broad and seemingly all-inclusive, is justifiable. Classifying plaintiffs into particular categories, either as a matter of law or on a
58. Id. at 971. The court recognized that "[p]rejudice is as irrational as is the selection of groups against whom it is directed. It is thus a matter of practice or attitude in the
community, it is usage or image based on all the mistaken concepts of 'race.'" Id.
59. Id. at 972.
60. Id. The court stated that "[i]t would not seem to serve a useful purpose to analyze the reasons for the acts of prejudice, as that can be left to the sociologists." Id.
61. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523, 526-27 (4th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987). In refusing to apply the reasoning of Manzanares, the court
limited its holding and stated as follows:
Manzanares did not hold that a defendant's mere perception of a plaintiff as
racially distinct is sufficient to constitute racial discrimination in violation of section 1981. Instead, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that Mexican-Americans, as a
group, are commonly treated differently from Anglo-Americans, as a group. We
do not find the position of Jews in this society to be analogous to that of Mexican-Americans or others commonly considered to be non-whites.
Id.
See also Anooya v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 733 F.2d 48, 50 n.5 (7th Cir. 1984)(The court
refused to apply the approach advocated by Manzanares because the plaintiff did not plead
special facts "that equate [to] the evil of racial discrimination as understood by the drafters of section 1981.").
62. Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2028 (1987).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
66. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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case-by-case basis, is simply impractical. Such avenues lead to inconsistent results and rules which may not accurately reflect the
needs of society. Furthermore, anthropologists and biologists have
nearly abandoned efforts to categorize society into specific racial
classifications.6 7 Perhaps the best approach is to simply abandon
the requirement that plaintiffs possess a distinctive physiognomy
and allow section 1981 to protect against ethnic origin
discrimination.
The Supreme Court's opinions in Saint Francis and Shaare
Tefila were logically sound and provided justifiable remedies to
groups which were the target of discrimination. In light of the
foregoing analysis,. the Court has also apparently chosen the most
practical approach to eliminating the inconsistencies which have
plagued the lower courts.
II.

AVAILABLE REMEDIES UNDER SECTION
AND SECTION

1981

1982

The Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila decisions have made
the traditional remedies under sections 1981 and 1982 available to
those who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. In order to fully
appreciate the impact of these landmark decisions, an exploration
of the scope of these two statutes is required.
A.

Section 1981

1. Basic Requirements
To successfully assert a section 1981 claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the discrimination was intentional. This normally requires proof that discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor behind the injurious action.6 8 In employment-related contexts, however, some courts have suggested that alternatives to
proving intent exist. In Ingram v. Madison Square Garden
Center, Inc., 9 the court held that if the criteria used by an em-

67. Saint Francis, 107 S. Ct. at 2026 n.4.
68. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375,
391 (1982)(stating that section 1981 can only be violated by purposeful discrimination);
Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 963 (D. Md. 1977)(stating that under
section 1981 plaintiffs must prove discriminatory motive or intent).
69. 482 F. Supp. 414, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(The plaintiffs were blacks and hispanics
who had been or planned to be employed as cleaners. The court held that "[w]hile the
plaintiffs have the initial burden to establish a prima facie case, that burden is satisfied by
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ployer to determine job eligibility operates to exclude minorities,
then a prima facie case of employment discrimination is satisfied
without the necessity of proving intent. The court also stated that
the prima facie case could be fulfilled by demonstrating the existence of a statistical disparity in light of surrounding
circumstances.70
The courts have also required actual discrimination before
the plaintiff can prevail under section 1981. In Gill v. Monroe
County Department of Social Services,71 the plaintiff filed suit
against her employer for embarrassing her through preferential
treatment. The court ruled that such an action could not prevail
under section 1981.72
Traditionally, the courts have required that the plaintiff be a
member of a particular race. 73 With respect to ethnic origin discrimination, however, this well-established requirement is no
longer an obstacle to obtaining section 1981 protection in light of
the recent Supreme Court decisions. Women and religious groups,
however, are still unable to seek protection under this statute unless, of course, they are able to allege a "racial" claim. 4
2. Scope
Despite these often difficult to prove requirements, plaintiffs
have successfully maintained section 1981 claims in a wide variety
of areas. These claims have been based upon private as well as
a showing similar to that required in disparate impact cases: proof of discriminatory motive
can rest on a statistical disparity plus an examination of the surrounding circumstances.").

70. Id. at 424. The court explained that:
[I]f the criteria used by an employer or union to determine job eligibility "operate to exclude" minority members, then despite a lack of discriminatory intent, a
prima facie case of employment discrimination is made out and the burden shifts
to the employer or union to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the
criteria and job performance.

Id.
71.
72.

79 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 324.

73. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-72 (1976)(Two black children,
through their parents, filed suit under section 1981, alleging that they had been wrongfully
denied admission to a private school because of their race. The Court held that section
1981 was intended to prohibit racial discrimination in areas which include the making and
enforcing of private contracts.); Schetter v. Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (E.D. Wis.
1969)(In describing the scope of section 1981, the court held that "[t]hese sections are
clearly limited to racial discrimination.").

74. Schetter, 300 F. Supp. at 1073 (The court noted that the applicability of section
1981 was limited to racial discrimination and did not apply to plaintiffs alleging discrimi-

nation on the grounds of religion or ethnic origin.).
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public acts of discrimination. 5 A large portion of litigation under
section 1981 has arisen in employment related contexts. Plaintiffs
have prevailed under this statute for acts of discrimination involving wrongful discharge,7 constructive discharge,77 unions,7 promotions,7 91 benefit and salary disparities,80 retaliation," and the

use of unfair tests as a basis for hiring.82 Employers have sometimes been able to successfully assert incompetency,8 3 misconduct,8 4 and seniority 5 as defenses to these allegations.

75. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 161. The Court held that "[s]ection 1981 prohibits private,
commercially operated, non-sectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are [black]." Id. at 161, syllabus pt. 1.
76. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 274 (1976). The plaintiffs were white employees who were discharged for misappropriating cargo from one of the
company's shipments. Black employees, however, who committed the same offense were not
discharged. The Court held that "section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private
employment against white persons as well as non-whites, and this conclusion is supported
both by the statute's language, which explicitly applies to 'all persons,' and by its legislative
history." Id.
77. See, e.g., Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 663 F.2d 1268 (4th Cir. 1981)(The plaintiffs charged discrimination in hiring, firing, promotion, job assignment, and geographical
assignment under section 1981. The employer utilized a "word of mouth" system to notify
employees of supervisory vacancies which restilted in an almost entirely white supervisory
staff.).
78. See, e.g., General Building Contractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375
(1982)(Although the petitioner was held not liable due to a lack of provable intent, the
Court ruled that the union had discriminated against black employees through the exclusive hiring hall and apprenticeship programs it established.).
79. See, e.g., Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co., 363 F. Supp. 961 (M.D.N.C. 1973)(The
plaintiff filed suit pursuant to section 1981 alleging that his employer's promotion procedures were discriminatory. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered that the
employer utilize a different promotion procedure so that both blacks and whites would be
notified of advancement opportunities.).
80. See, e.g., Rowser v. Miller, 631 F.2d 433. (6th Cir. 1980)(The plaintiffs filed suit
alleging that their employer refused to give black employees the same accumulated vacation pay as given to white employees. The court of appeals reversed the lower court's
dismissal.).
81. See, e.g., London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1981)(The
plaintiff charged her employer with racial discrimination in taking retaliatory action
against her after she filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.).
82. See, e.g., Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973)(Baltimore's Fire Department required all applicants to take a penmanship and multiple choice
written test. These tests were allegedly used to discriminate against black employees.).
83. See, e.g., Grigsby v. North Mississippi Medical Center, 586 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.
1978)(The court of appeals held that the district court properly concluded that a black
mental health worker was discharged for reasons totally unrelated to his race.).
84. See, e.g., Hagans v. Budd Co., 597 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Pa. 1984)(The plaintiff
was discharged after beating his supervisor. The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove
that he was treated differently from white employees charged with beating supervisors and
could not therefore prevail.).
85. Geer v. General Motors Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1067, 1081 (N.D. Ga. 1984) In
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Generally, however, the courts have ruled that employers can
impose grooming standards upon their employees. Even though
such requirements may seem to affect only certain groups of individuals, the courts have held that such requirements do not constitute a section 1981 violation.8" Thus, if Saint Francis College were
to impose a requirement that none of its employees were to wear
turbans or yarmulkes, Arabs and Jews would most likely fail to
prevail in a section 1981 action.
Although plaintiffs in the field of education have occasionally
been able to prevail on employment-related section 1981 claims,8"
the defendant will usually prevail if he is able to justify the removal of a teacher on the grounds of incompetence88 or misconduct. 9 Furthermore, the court in Hopkins v. Wasson9" ruled that
a plaintiff who did not have tenure and whose contract had expired did not state a cause of action under section 1981. Therefore, although the recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded
the number of potential plaintiffs, parties such as Al-Khazraji, the
plaintiff in Saint Francis, will still find it difficult to prevail on
section 1981 claims.
3. Significance of Expanded Coverage of Section 1981
The significance of these recent Supreme Court decisions
should not be overlooked despite the potentially overlapping protection against ethnic origin discrimination provided by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the equal protection clause of

Geer, the court held that the records provided "no basis for finding that the seniority crite-

rion was merely a ruse for race discrimination." Id.
86. See, e.g., Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y.

1981)(The plaintiff was a black female who challenged a rule prohibiting employees from
wearing an all-braided hairstyle. The court held that the rule did not discriminate against
women or blacks.).

87. See, e.g., Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1003 (1967)(The plaintiff was a black school teacher who filed suit alleging that she
was wrongfully discharged. In reversing the lower court's dismissal, the Fourth Circuit held
that minor infractions committed by a teacher with an excellent record over a 12-year

period could not justify her termination.).
88. See, e.g., Alexander v. Warren School District, 464 F.2d 471 (8th Cir.
1972)(The court held that in light of extensive evidence of the plaintiff's incompetence, it
could not be determined that the school board was motivated by racial prejudice when it
failed to reemploy the plaintiff.).

89. See, e.g., Duke v. North Texas State University, 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.
1972)(The plaintiff was discharged for making speeches using profane language and criti-

cizing the university administration. The Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the defendants.).
90.

227 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), affid, 329 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1964).
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the United States Constitution. Both Title VII and the equal pro-

tection clause provide a basis upon which parties can litigate ethnic origin discrimination claims. 9 ' Nonetheless, section 1981 possesses both substantive and procedural differences which make the
expansion of its protection highly significant.92 It is not the purpose of this Note to focus upon the distinctions between these avenues of protection. Instead, this Note seeks to merely highlight a
few of the distinctions so that a proper understanding of the re-

cent Supreme Court decisions can be obtained.
With respect to the equal protection clause, the obvious dis-

tinction between it and section 1981 is that the equal protection
clause does not apply to private acts of discrimination.93 In other
words, discrimination on the part of a governmental body or one

of its agents is necessary for the plaintiff to bring an ethnic origin
discrimination claim under the equal protection clause.94 Thus,
both Al-Khazraji and the Shaare Tefila Congregation would be
unable to sustain a cause of action on equal protection grounds
because they could not show any state action. Most of the section
1981 claims discussed above would likewise be precluded.

An examination of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
reveals that similar distinctions exist between that Act and section
1981. Procedurally, a claimant under Title VII is first required to

exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit in the
courts.95 These procedures almost always require potential plain-

tiffs to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1986)(The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an
employer from denying an individual a position on the basis of that individual's "race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."). Similarly, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has been repeatedly used to allow parties to assert ethnic origin discrimination claims. Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
92. For a more detailed analysis of these distinctions, see Kaufman, supra note 37.
93. The fourteenth amendment states in relevant part that "[n]o state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States;. .. nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
94. See Kaufman, supra note 37, at 267.
95. Stewart v. Wappingers Central School District, 437 F. Supp. 250, 252-53
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). The court stated:
[A]ny claim predicated on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 cannot
succeed for failure of plaintiffs to initially pursue federal administrative relief.
However, by contrast, section 1981 was designed to afford a federal remedy for
acts of discrimination separate and distinct from any relief available under Title
VII; consequently, exhaustion is not required ....
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Opportunity Commission. After conducting an investigation, the
Commission will decide whether the plaintiff's claim is factually
meritorious and, based upon its decission, it will grant or deny the
claimant the opportunity to file suit in court. 97 This filtering process is not required under section" 1981. Rather, plaintiffs may file
their section 1981 actions directly in the federal courts. 98
Another distinction between these provisions is that parties
asserting claims under Title VII are subject to a host of procedural time constraints which are not pre~ent under section 1981. 99
One can easily imagine how this limitation alone serves to bar
many claims.
A great disparity also exists with respect to the remedies

available under section 1981 and Title VII. Unlike Title VII, section 1981 seeks not only to eradicate discrimination but also at-

tempts to make plaintiffs "whole."' 10 Section 1981 achieves this
goal by providing damages for mental humiliation, compensatory
damages for physical and emotional harm, and punitive damages. 10 1 Recovery under Title VII is much more limited. For example, recovery of back-pay is limited to only two years. 102
Furthermore, unlike Title VII, section 1981 permits parties to
try their cases before a jury.10 3 Allowing plaintiffs to take their
cases to sympathetic juries may result in larger judgments for victims of ethnic origin discrimination.

96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1986).
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e) to -5(f) (1986).
98. Wrenn v. State of Kansas, 561 F. Supp. 1216, 1219 (D. Kan. 1983). The court
stated that "[a] charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not required for lawsuits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Id.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1986).
100. Compensatory damages are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but are unavailable to parties seeking relief under Title VII. See Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d
251 (8th Cir. 1985).
101. Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 1985). The court
stated:
Section 1981 ... is aimed at rectifying individual acts of discrimination against
racial and ethnic minorities in a myriad of situations, and it clearly lacks a
'make-whole' purpose. Section 1981's emphasis on eradicating direct personal
discrimination and on making victims of such discrimination more than 'whole'
is mirrored by the fact that, in order to recover, a plaintiff must always prove
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him and by the remedies
available to an injured plaintiff, i.e., punitive damages and compensatory damages for physical and emotional harm.
Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1986).
103. Bibbs v. Jim Lynch Cadillac, Inc., 653 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981).
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Substantively, section 1981 offers no greater protection than
Title VII. 04 However, these two statutes provide separate and dis-

tinct causes of action. 0 5 In construing the conditions for recovery
under Title VII, the courts have not emphasized the intent re-

quirement to the extent that it has been emphasized in section
1981 cases. In fact, some courts have held that proof of inten-

tional discrimination is not an essential element of a Title VII
claim.' 06 Similarly, the standards of discrimination under section
1981 are considered to be more stringent than those of Title
VII. 07
As the foregoing comparison reveals, section 1981 has more

stringent substantive requirements yet far less procedural obstacles than Title VII. Section 1981 allows more claims to have access to the courts but places higher substantive requirements to
ensure that only valid claims will be entitled to recovery. This
broad access allows plaintiffs with valid claims, such as those
brought in Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila, to obtain judgments
they could not have otherwise obtained. Therefore, the fact that
the Supreme Court expanded the protection provided by section
1981, as opposed to other protective mechanisms, is highly
significant.
B.

Section 1982

In Shaare Tefila, the United States Supreme Court discussed
and applied section 1982 as though it were identical to section
1981.1°8 In light of precedent, such treatment is perfectly legitimate.' 0 9 Both statutes have their origin in the Civil Rights Act of

104. New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979). The Court
stated that "[a]lthough the exact applicability of [section 1981] has not been decided by
this Court, it seems clear that it affords no greater substantive protection than Title VII."
Id.
105. See, e.g., Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
106. Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 1979)(holding that
"proof of intentional discrimination is not essential to recovery in a Title VII action even
when the employer is a governmental agency").
107. Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir. 1984).
The court noted that "[the standards under § 1981 are more stringent than those of Title
VII. Hence when a plaintiff fails to meet its burden of proof under Title VII, it also fails to
establish a claim under § 1981." Id.
108. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019, 2020 (1987).
109. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431, 439 (1973). The
Court stated that "[tihe operative language of both section 1981 and section 1982 is traceable to the Act of April 9, 1866 . . . . In light of the historical interrelationship between
section 1981 and section 1982, we see no reason to construe these sections differently when
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1866, and have consequently been interpreted as having the same
legislative purpose behind their respective protections. 110
Plaintiffs bringing section 1982 claims must meet many of
the same requirements as plaintiffs bringing section 1981 claims.
For example, plaintiffs must prove that the alleged discrimination
was racially motivated and intentional.' As mentioned previously, this requirement is difficult to prove and therefore greatly
reduces the likelihood of a plaintiff's success." 2
Not surprisingly, section 1982 was traditionally construed as
applying only to those plaintiffs customarily considered to be of
another race."' Thus, plaintiffs claiming ethnic origin discrimination were formerly unable to maintain a section 1982 claim. In
granting the defendant's summary judgment, the court in Patel v.
Holly House Motels 14 held that "a refusal to sell based solely
upon the country of an individual's ancestry, or upon the cultural
and linguistic characteristics common to an ethnic or national origin group, will not support a claim under section 1982."" 1 As discussed earlier, the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions
have created an entirely new avenue through which such discrimination can be fought. As is the case with section 1981 actions,
gender based discrimination has not been considered within the
scope of section 1982,116 and7white plaintiffs have been permitted
to file section 1982 claims .1
The significance of Saint Francisand Shaare Tefila is clearly
demonstrated when section 1982 is compared with other statutes

applied ..
" Id.
110. Id.
I 11. Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 965 (D. Md. 1977)(holding

that "[t]he Supreme Court's reading of the operative terms found in sections 1981 and
1982 ... require[s] discriminatory 'motivation' ").
112. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
113. Schetter v. Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1969)(In failing to find
jurisdiction, the court stated that sections 1981 and 1982 "are clearly limited to racial

discrimination origin.").

they do not pertain to discrimination on grounds of religion or national

114. 483 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Ala. 1979)(the plaintiff was of Indian origin and
claimed ethnic origin discrimination when operators of a small motel refused to sell to

him).
115. Id. at 383.
116. Lee v. Minnock, 417 F. Supp. 436, 439 (W.D. Pa. 1976)(ruling that
"[d]iscrimination because of sex is not a basis for redress under section 1982").
117. Schneider v. Bahler, 564 F. Supp. 1449, 1455-56 (N.D. Ind. 1983)(stating

"that it is possible for persons of the white race to state a claim for racial discrimination
under section 1982").
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providing similar protection. One such statute is the Fair Housing
Act of 1968 which, although similar to section 1982, allows a
plaintiff to state a cause of action entirely separate from actions
brought under section 1982.118 The Fair Housing Act contains

several procedural limitations not found in section 1982.11 For example, actions brought under section 1982 are not barred by a
180-day statute of limitations. 120 Also, section 1982 permits ac-

tions against defendants that own or rent a less than four-unit
dwelling structure, who would not be subject to an action brought
121
under the Fair Housing Act.
Section 1982 is also considered substantially broader in its
protection than the Fair Housing Act of 1968.122 Plaintiffs have

used section 1982 to successfully maintain claims of property-re23
lated discrimination concerning the use of recreational facilities1
and the implementation of zoning laws.'2 Plaintiffs have also successfully asserted claims involving discriminatory property
purchasing 125 and leasing. 126 Therefore, the recent expansion of
the scope of section 1982 appears to have provided significant new
protections.

118. United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.
1971)(The court stated that "[a]n action under the Fair Housing Act does not necessarily
encompass a suit under the Act of 1866, and vice versa.").
119. Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1975)(The plaintiffs,
who were black, brought an action against a Nebraska realtor and homeowner alleging
discrimination. The case was dismissed because it was barred by the 180-day statute of
limitations of the Fair Housing Act.).
120. Id. at 732.
121. Johnson v. Zaremba, 381 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. I11. 1973)(The court concluded
that even though the defendant brought himself within an exception to the scope of the
Fair Housing Act by showing that he maintained rooms occupied by no more than four
families, he did not thereby show any defense to the plaintiff's section 1982 claims.).
122. Warner v. Perrino, 585 F.2d 171, 173 (6th Cir. 1978)(holding that section 1981
"encompasses a much broader scope of activity than the 1968 Fair Housing Act").
123. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969)(The plaintiffs
brought suit alleging racial discrimination pursuant to section 1982 when they were denied
access to a private playground and park.).
124. Hope, Inc. v. DuPage County, 717 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1983)(The court concluded that the county engaged in intentional discrimination by establishing a zoning ordinance and then granting or denying variations dependent upon race and economic strata.).
125. Williams v. The Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th. Cir. 1974)(The plaintiffs
alleged racial discrimination against developers who sold lots in a subdivision only to approved builders, which operated to exclude black persons.).
126. Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)(The plaintiffs brought
suit for racial discrimination pursuant to section 1982 when an owner of a two-family home
refused to lease them an apartment.).
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Francis and Shaare Tefila
Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila are well-reasoned opinions
that undoubtedly resolve many .of the inconsistencies that have
plagued the lower courts. However, the Supreme Court has failed
to provide the lower courts with a definite set of guidelines which
would dictate how these decisions are to be applied in the future.
Through the use of a hypothetical fact pattern, this Note will
raise various uncertainties as to the application of these cases and
offer suggestions for their resolution.
A. Legal Framework
In Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the United States
Supreme Court determined that Congress intended section 1981
1 27
to protect "identifiable classes" from intentional discrimination.
Unfortunately, the Court failed to provide a precise definition of
that phrase. The Court did, however, note that a distinctive physiognomy was not essential for plaintiffs to qualify for section 1981
protection. a2
The requirements for such an action were set forth in Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 29 in which the Court held that a
charge of racial discrimination under section 1982 could only be
established by alleging that the defendants were motivated by a
racial animus and that the defendants' animus was directed toward the kind of group that Congress intended to protect when it
passed the statute. 130 In Saint Francis, the Court cited several
ethnic groups which the enacting Congress considered to be ra13
cially distinctive.
Eventually, the Court determined that Arabs and Jews, as
identifiable groups, met the criteria and were permitted to have
their claims stand for judgment. In refusing to dismiss the plaintiff's claims, the Court in Saint Francisstated, "[i]f respondent on
remand can prove that he was subject to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather than
solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he will

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2028 (1987).
Id.
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019, 2020 (1987).
Id.
Saint Francis, 107 S. Ct. at 2027-28.
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132

Hypothetical Facts

Let us suppose that an employer is suddenly faced with a
small degree of unexpected financial hardship, requiring him to
lay off an employee. For some unknown reason, the employer despises individuals of Armenian ancestry. As the employer examines a list of employees, he notices the name Armeniano and automatically concludes that the employee is of Armenian ancestry. In
the presence of several witnesses, he declares that he hates all
Armenians and states that he feels they are all dishonest and
linked to organized crime. Without reviewing any employee work
evaluation reports, or discussing the matter with any supervisors,
the employer terminates Armeniano's employment even though
Armeniano has more seniority than several other employees.
Armeniano can also demonstrate that he has an unblemished work
record and has been praised by his supervisors for his superior
work product.
After learning of his employer's remarks, Armeniano files
suit against his former employer alleging racial discrimination
pursuant to section 1981. Interestingly, the plaintiff does not possess the physical characteristics prevalent among Armenians. Unlike most descendants of Indo-European immigrants, Armeniano
has fair hair, a fair complexion, and blue eyes.
C. Proposed Application
In light of the approach recently adopted by the United
States Supreme Court, Armeniano's claims may not be dismissed.
Under this approach, Armeniano must first meet the threshold requirement that he belong to an identifiable group.133 This requirement should not be applied stringently to exclude potential plaintiffs. The entire purpose of the Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila
opinions was to remove barriers posed by vague terms such as
"race." Thus, in applying this threshold requirement, the lower
courts should not attempt to define the words "identifiable, .... ethnic," or "ancestry." Rather, if a plaintiff identifies himself as
within an ethnic classification, he should be held to have fulfilled
this requirement. This ethnic classification will usually, but not
132.
133.

Id. at 2028.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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always, be based upon identification with a foreign country, region, or historical classification.
In the hypothetical, Armeniano can easily fulfill this requirement. Through his self-classification, he has associated himself
with an "identifiable group." His identifiable class is composed of
those Americans whose ancestors immigrated from Armenia to
America. For the purposes of a section 1981 or section 1982
claim, such a classification is sufficient. 4
Unlike most Americans of Armeftian descent, Armeniano
does not possess typical Indo-European physical characteristics.
Under the recent Supreme Court holdings, however, a plaintiff's
possession of physically identifiable characteristics, or a lack
thereof, is irrelevant. 35 Therefore, although the plaintiff does not
possess physical characteristics which clearly manifest his Armenian ancestry, he cannot be denied an opportunity to present his
claims.
Another essential requirement to the pleading of a sustainable section 1981 claim is that the plaintiff must allege that the
defendant's animus was directed toward a group that Congress intended to protect when it passed the statute. 36 This requirement
raises the question as to whether Congress must have specifically
mentioned the group of which the plaintiff is a member as protected when it passed the statute. The answer to this question is
obviously no. Armeniano should be protected under section 1981
even though he is a member of an identifiable group which was
not mentioned in the legislative history cited by the Court.137 Obviously, the late nineteenth century legislatures could not have
possibly listed each and every group that they considered to be
distinctively racial. Congress did, however, specifically mention
many different ethnic groups.' 38 The groups listed should be considered as a list of examples, rather than an exhaustive list. Thus,
one could argue by analogy that since Congress considered Prussians to be racially distinctive, it would have considered those
from the neighboring country of Armenia to be equally distinctive.

134. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
136. Shaare Tefila, 107 S. Ct. at 2021.
137. Saint Francis, 107 S. Ct. at 2027.

138.

Id. The Court noted that the legislative history of section 1981 had its source

in both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Voting Rights Act of 1870. The debates

regarding these Acts specifically referred to Scandinavian, Chinese, Latin, Spanish, AngloSaxon, Jewish, Black, Mongolian, and Gypsie races. Id.
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Alternatively, a plaintiff could argue that congressional allusion to
his specific classification is not essential. This argument is supported by the result in Saint Francis in which the Court held that
an Arab-American satisfied the test even though a specific citation
to such a classification could not be found in the legislative
history. 139
Finally, plaintiffs must allege that the defendants were "motivated by a racial animus."140 This requirement ties into the general section 1981 requirement that the plaintiff must prove the
defendant's intent to discriminate. 141 The inquiry into intent will
require the court to probe into the defendant's mind. However, the
defendant's personal definition of race is irrelevant. Rather, definitions of the term race are to be derived only from the notions
expressed by the enacting Congress. 4 2 This understanding is
clearly supported by the Court's strict adherence to legislative
history.
Once the plaintiff has met the requirements set forth in Saint
Francis and Shaare Tefila, he should be entitled to have his claim
adjudicated before an appropriate court. If Armeniano can prove
that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the
fact that he was born an Armenian, he should be entitled to recovery. He is clearly able to classify himself within an identifiable
group which the enacting Congress sought to protect. Further, the
plaintiff's lack of Armenian characteristics should not preclude
him from recovery. Based upon the statements made by his employer, he should be able to easily prove that the employer's actions were motivated by a racial animus.
Applying the legal framework provided in Saint Francis and
Shaare Tefila to a hypothetical fact pattern, this Note identified
and dismissed potential problems which may have been encountered by the lower courts. The analysis encourages courts to apply
the identifiable group and the legislative intent requirements
loosely. Additionally, the analysis suggests that the racial animus
requirement should be viewed objectively in light of the appropriate legislative history.

139.
140.
141.
142.

See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
Shaare Tefila, 107 S. Ct. at 2021.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

In St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila
Congregationv. Cobb, the Supreme Court has finally laid to rest a
great deal of confusion that has .plagued the lower federal courts
for some time. A careful examination of these decisions has revealed that they are not only just, but that they are also wellreasoned and logical in their interpretation of the rights protected
by sections 1981 and 1982.
In an effort to add a clear meaning to the term "race," the
Court turned to the notions expressed by Congress when the statutes' precursor was enacted.14 3 Through its reliance upon legislative history, the Court legitimized its decision to incorporate individuals who are victims of ethnic origin discrimination within the
reach of sections 1981 and 1982. In doing so, the Court ended the
debate as to the source of the meaning of "race."
The Court did not completely end the debate, however, in
that it did not provide a precise set of guidelines for the application of its rule. Although the Court eliminated the dispute as to
the source of the meaning of "race," it arguably replaced one
vague term with a series of equally vague phrases, namely "identifiable classes," "racial animus," and "ethnic origin." In this author's view, these phrases should not result in the same type of
confusion that previously confronted the lower courts. Rather,
these terms should impose a very low burden upon potential plaintiffs. Thus, the lower courts should not attempt to precisely define
these terms in a manner which places any significant burden upon
plaintiffs.
Additionally, a showing of a racial animus need not hinge on
the defendant's particular subjective notions of race. Rather,
whether an animus was racial or not depends upon whether it was
directed toward a group the enacting Congress intended to protect. Whether the enacting Congress intended to protect a group
should not be limited by those ethnic groups actually mentioned in
the legislative history. The groups Congress specifically mentioned
are not to be construed as an exhaustive list but rather as a list of
examples to which a plaintiff may analogize.
Viewed in light of this proposed application,""' the decisions
rendered in Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila have created a wide

143.
144.

Saint Francis, 107 S. Ct. at 2027-28.
See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
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range of potential plaintiffs who were previously unable to obtain

access to judicial adjudication. The expansions under these particular statutes are highly significant when compared to the limits of
the pre-existing statutory protections. 1" Nevertheless, plaintiffs

will still encounter the inherent limitation of proving intent in
their battle to seek redress for injuries resulting from bigotry. 4 6
RICHARD

A. Di Lisi

145. See supra notes 68-126 and accompanying text.
146. The traditional scope of § 1981's protection has been significantly limited by
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), which was issued after this
Note went to press. Under Patterson, the only discriminatory conduct that is actionable
under § 1981 is conduct at the initial formation of the contract and conduct that impairs
the right to enforce contractual obligations through legal process.

